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Abstract
A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator)
compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to
invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with
similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase
is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes -
full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk
sharing - on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when
the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving
the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in
equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services.
Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and
a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.
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1 Introduction
Telecommunications markets are experiencing a period of drastic technological develop-
ment. The possibility to build a so-called Next Generation Network (NGN) gives firms the
chance to exploit extremely faster transmission and thereby enrich their offer with more
interactive and sophisticated services. However, the actual existence and importance of a
demand for NGN applications is often uncertain1. The technology has been available for
a while now, but given the high fixed costs needed to build the necessary infrastructure,
and the risks associated with demand and regulatory uncertainty, the NGN deployment
is progressing slowly in many countries.
The vexing issue as to how to provide firms with enough investment incentives, while
eventually retaining the benefits of network development for final consumers, is highly
debated by industry actors, regulators and scholars. In particular, access regulation is
widely argued about its potential discouraging effect on regulated firms’ investment. When
obliged to share its network elements with facilities-free rivals at a regulated access price,
the incumbent may feel reluctant to invest in NGN because of the spillover effect enjoyed by
the Other Licensed Operators (OLO). For these reasons, access regulation, mainly in the
form of mandatory unbundling, may induce less or later incumbent’s investment compared
to an unregulated scenario, but also compared to the socially desired level (Chang et al.
(2003); Crandall and Singer (2003); Ingraham and Sidak (2003); Bourreau and Dogan
(2005); Pindyck (2007); Grajek and Ro¨ller (2011), Nardotto et al. (2012)). The European
Commission seems to acknowledge these concerns for future investments in NGN. In the
Recommendation C(2010) 6223 on “Regulated Access to NGANs” (September 2010), the
possibility of relaxing - if not eliminating - ex ante regulation when a risk sharing agreement
backs up the deployment of NGN is openly considered.
The issue of broadband investment and regulation has attracted and still attracts a
lot of research attention.2 Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by addressing
the issue of access price setting when the incumbent has the option to invest in NGN
and investment returns in terms of demand increase are uncertain. Using a model where
a vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO dynamically compete in the market for
broadband access, we analyse the effect of three different access regimes on the incentives
to invest by the incumbent: full regulation (mandatory unbundling for NGN), partial
regulation (no mandatory unbundling for NGN) and risk sharing. We then compare their
1See for instance The Economist (2010) about lack of demand for NGN services in the United
States.
2Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on
broadband investment and access regulation.
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impact on social welfare, balancing the effect of each regulatory regime on static and
dynamic efficiency.
In our paper, we follow the original set-up of broadband investment and access regu-
lation developed by Foros (2004).3 We develop a model with two firms having different
ability to offer value-added services, and analyse the impact of access price regulation on
the incumbent’s investment incentive. Differently from Foros (2004), however, we adopt a
dynamic model of technology adoption and we include demand uncertainty for value-added
NGN services. Considering that NGN investment might fail to expand market demand,
we also assume that the OLO can possibly switch back to the copper network if there is
no demand for NGN applications and the access to copper is cheaper. We then conduct
our analysis comparing the impact on investment of three alternative access regimes. In
this respect, the paper closer to ours is Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011). The authors analyse
a simple two-stage framework with identical firms, where the incumbent is the only firm
entitled with investment option and investment success in terms of demand increase is
uncertain. Their work compares the impact of different modes of regulation (access price
based on costs, risk sharing and regulatory holiday) in terms of investment extent and
consumer welfare outcomes. There are several differences between our work and Nitsche
and Wiethaus (2011)’s one. Firstly, in their model, following Klumpp and Su (2010),
the access charge is determined ex post from the equilibrium quantities and it includes a
partial allocation of the fixed costs borne by the incumbent. In our model, the regulator
establishes ex ante the level of access price, via first-order conditions. As a consequence,
the benchmark case for access regulation in our model is a marginal cost-based rule, as
in much of the literature in this field (Foros (2004), Kotakorpi (2006) for instance). Sec-
ondly, our setting is dynamic and we investigate the timing of investment in a context with
demand uncertainty, rather than the extent of the investment. Moreover, we are able to
carry out a complete welfare analysis, whereas Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s work only
gives an overview of the different modes of regulation’s implications in terms of consumer
welfare. Lastly, our model includes quality differentiation a` la Foros and considers its
impact on equilibrium results, while, in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s model, firms are
undifferentiated.
The impact of uncertainty on the timing of telecommunications infrastructure develop-
ment has also been analysed in several papers that feature dynamic race models between
3A similar approach has been recently used by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012). In their model the
authors analyse the incumbent’s incentive to invest under regulatory non-commitment, generalizing
the results by Foros (2004). In our paper, instead, we use a dynamic investment model and demand
uncertainty and we also compare different regulatory regimes in terms of their welfare implications.
Our analysis is thus complementary to the Mizuno and Yoshino’s one.
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incumbent and entrant operators and focus on specific access pricing regimes, mainly reg-
ulatory holidays (Hori and Mizuno (2006), Hori and Mizuno (2009), Gans (2001), Gans
(2007) and Vareda and Hoernig (2010)). In our model, by contrast, we consider uncer-
tainty in a dynamic setting, but we focus on services-based competition, while taking into
account different possible regulatory regimes. Since the co-existence of the legacy network
and the new fibre network is highly inefficient and not sustainable over a long period, we
also analyse the case in which the switch to NGN is compulsory and compare it with the
case in which the switch can be postponed and depends only on the access conditions. We
find that, in case of compulsory switch, the OLO gets relatively worse access condition
absent regulation.
Our paper also differs from a recent strand of studies that analyse an investment game
where both the incumbent and entrants have the option to invest. Brito et al. (2012)
examine the incentives of a vertically integrated firm (regulated at wholesale level) to
invest and give access to a new (upgraded) wholesale technology, that is not subject to
access regulation. Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2011) and Inderst and Peitz (2012a)
analyse the incentives to migrate from an old technology to a new one, and examine how
wholesale access conditions affect this migration. Finally, Manenti and Sciala` (2011) study
the impact of access regulation on entrant and incumbent’s investment and show that, in
absence of regulation, the incumbent would choose an access charge to the new infrastruc-
ture that prevents resale-based entry, thereby overstimulating entrant’s investment which
may eventually turn out to be inefficiently high.
Our model reveals that the differences in ability to provide value-added services and
their absolute values with respect to the overall level of demand highly affect the investment
choice. Since the OLO has the alternative to switch back to the copper network instead
of leaving the market entirely, we find, in contrast to Foros (2004), that there are cases in
which exclusion does not happen even when the incumbent is better in providing value-
added services than the OLO. In case of mandatory switch to the NGN, we find that the
OLO remains active in the market if and only if its ability to provide value-added services
is higher than the incumbent’s one. The equilibrium results show that the investment is
always undertaken later than in the social optimum and that the presence of uncertainty
has the effect of delaying the investment even further. Full regulation lowers the investment
incentives due to a hold-up problem of the regulator who exploits the irreversibility of
the incumbent’s investment ex post. Due to a combination of competitive intensity and
investment incentives, we find that risk sharing is the most preferable regime from a
consumer welfare perspective, but also from a total welfare perspective for a large range
of parameters.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and the main findings under the three different regulatory regimes. Section 3 summarises
the paper and concludes.
2 The Model
We first present the basic features of the model. Then we present the results of the
following regimes: full regulation, where the access charges to the legacy network and to
the NGN are regulated; partial regulation, where only the access charge to the legacy
network is regulated; risk sharing. Finally we illustrate the welfare comparisons between
the different cases.
2.1 The Basic Framework
Two firms compete downstream for the provision of broadband connectivity. One firm
is a vertically integrated incumbent, who owns the existing infrastructure, constituted
by the copper network, and has the obligation to unbundle the network elements to its
competitor under access regulation. The access fee to the existing infrastructure is assumed
to be regulated at marginal cost. The second firm is a downstream competitor, leasing
lines from the incumbent. Both firms provide the same services via the existing network,
e.g. the conventional PC-centric services like www and email.
The incumbent firm has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network
(NGN). Such networks allow firms for a drastic improvement of the services provided, e.g.
more speed in data transmission, enabling interactive TV-centric and gaming broadband
services, IP-based and high definition TV, more capacity and faster connectivity.
The incumbent can decide at any time whether to invest in the NGN or to keep on
using the copper network. Its investment choice is a one-time decision and it cannot
be updated in a later period. Once it decides to invest, the incumbent must build a
network that covers the entire market. When we talk about the entire market, we refer
to regions that present roughly similar demand structures, particularly regarding the level
of uncertainty about the NGN success. The rival can then decide whether to keep on
using the copper network, or to ask the incumbent for access to the NGN by paying an
access fee. In fact, the entrant might prefer to wait before starting to offer value-added
services, given the uncertainty concerning the demand and the costs related to launching
new offers. Alternatively, the incumbent and the entrant can jointly undertake and share
the cost of the investment under a risk sharing agreement. In this case, we assume that
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each operator can use the NGN without any side payments.
Broadband services are sold by both operators to end-users at a fixed subscription
fee independent of actual usage and time connected. Hence firms face downward sloping
demand curves. Services provided by the two firms through the copper network are perfect
substitutes. The adoption of NGN enriches the retail offer with value-added services.
If the investment turns out to be successful, the chance to obtain value-added services
increases consumers’ willingness to pay and shifts demand curves upwards for both firms.
Consumers’ quality perception of the value-added services is differentiated between the
two firms, so the respective market shares will be affected. In case of failure, there is no
shift in demand.
Considering the fact that broadband services in the retail market face capacity con-
straints in the regional and the global backbones, we assume that there is Cournot com-
petition in the retail market and the quantity sold is interpreted as the number of end
users adopting a broadband connection. We assume that the access to the copper network
is regulated at marginal cost level and there is no regulation in the retail market. Access
pricing is the only regulatory tool in the context here, and, since the existing regulatory
methods are designed for linear access pricing, we assume a linear access price. Fur-
thermore, in line with the existing EU regulatory framework, we assume that the access
charge to the new broadband network has to cover at least the network operating cost, so
it cannot be set below marginal cost.4 Moreover, the regulator has an imperfect ability to
make credible commitment, i.e. it is able to commit to a certain regulatory regime (full
or partial regulation), but he cannot commit to the NGN access charge level before the
investment is deployed.5
In order to reflect the need to foster the adoption of NGN in the current state of
market uncertainty, we examine the conditions for which all operators decide to use the
NGN as soon as it is deployed even though its success is still uncertain. Regulators want
to make the switch to NGN faster, eventually avoiding the cost duplications arising from
the overlapping use of copper network and NGN. Since the regulator cannot commit to
a certain level of access charge before the investment is deployed, the decision upon the
access conditions are taken after the investment stage. We assume that the regulator
4As we will show in next paragraphs, this restriction, aside from being more realistic, is due
to the OLO’s option to switch back to the ”old” copper network. To make our analysis more
complete, we will relax this assumption in section 2.4, forcing the OLO to switch to the NGN.
5The literature is divided over the possibility of regulatory commitment. For example, Foros
(2004) assumes that regulatory commitment is always absent, similarly to the paper by Brito et al.
(2010), where the adoption of a two-part tariff can partially mitigate the regulatory commitment
problem. In contrast, the regulator’s capability of credible commitment is present in Katakorpi
(2006) and Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011).
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sets a sort of state-dependent access charge, as in Vareda (2010), that will adapt to the
demand conditions once they become common knowledge with the phase of retail market
competition.6
In theory, the OLO can decide to use the NGN immediately after the investment is
deployed, before the state of demand is revealed; or it can wait and see what is the true
state of demand, and then decide which network to use. In order to limit the ex post
entrant’s opportunism, i.e. the possibility that the entrant leaves the NGN if the realised
demand happens to be (very) low, the regulator establishes access conditions under a long
term contract, in such a way that after the initial decision to switch to the new network, the
OLO will continue to use the NGN. Therefore, we focus our analysis on access conditions
for which the OLO switches to the NGN immediately after the investment is deployed
and does not change its decision after the demand is revealed. Given the difficulties in the
take-off of NGN networks in the current state of market uncertainty, indeed, analysing the
circumstances under which more industry players would actually decide to initially join
and use the NGN thereafter is a matter of greater social interest. In an extension of the
model at section 2.4, we analyse the implications of a compulsory switch to the NGN for
the OLO.
The timing of the model is the following (see Figure 1):7
Stage 0 At any time, the incumbent firm (together with the OLO, in case of risk
sharing) decides whether to invest in building a NGN or to keep on using the copper
network;
Stage 1 Once the investment in the new network is deployed, with full access regu-
lation (partial access regulation), the regulator (the incumbent firm) chooses the access
price to be paid by the OLO to use the NGN;
Stage 2
- At any time after the access conditions have become common knowledge, the OLO
decides whether to keep on using the legacy network or upgrade and ask access to the
NGN;
- The state of demand is revealed and the two firms compete a` la Cournot in the retail
market.
Notice that in the risk sharing case, Stage 1 and the first bullet point of Stage 2 are
absent.
6Vareda (2010) analyses the impact of access regulation when an entrant has to decide whether
to invest in a telecommunications network or to ask for access, and the regulator cannot observe its
efficiency level. The paper shows that the regulator must set access prices contingent on demand,
in order to induce the entrant to reveal its efficiency level.
7A similar structure of the game has been adopted by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012).
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Figure 1: Timing of the Model
Demand Side
Consumers have unit demand. Their valuation of a firm’s service is divided into two
parts: one is for the basic broadband services and the other is for the value-added services
running on NGN. Following Foros (2004), we assume the former is heterogeneous but the
latter is homogeneous. Therefore a representative consumer’s valuation of firm i’s service
is given by: 
v + βi with probability γ, case of successv with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Subscripts i = 1, 2 indicate incumbent and OLO, respectively. Here v is interpreted
as the consumer’s willingness to pay for the basic service without new technology and
is assumed to be uniformly distributed in (−∞, a]. Following Foros (2004), we allow for
negative values of v in order to avoid corner solutions where all consumers enter the market.
βi describes firm i’s ability to offer value-added services after a successful investment and
is assumed to belong to the interval (0, g) with g = a − c > 0, where c is the marginal
cost for the provision of value-added services. Unlike Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) and
similarly to Foros (2004), firms’ abilities are differentiated. Notice also that there is no
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chance here for an overall ”drastic” or ”non-drastic” investment, as in Brito et al. (2012),
since the market is never covered.8 As in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), market success is
uncertain: the investment increases consumers’ willingness to pay by βi with a probability
equal to γ, with γ ∈ (0, 1); or, consumers’ willingness to pay does not increase at all, even
though NGN enhances the quality of services, with a probability equal to (1− γ). Notice
that the binary nature of uncertainty greatly simplifies the analysis and captures the main
feature of uncertainty.
The subscription fee charged by firm i is pi. A representative consumer buys from firm
i other than firm j (j = 1, 2 and j 6= i) if the following conditions are satisfied:

v + βi − pi > v + βj − pj with probability γ, case of successv − pi > v − pj with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Therefore the firms’ quality-adjusted prices P should be equal if both firms are active
in the market:
pi − βi = pj − βj = P with probability γ, case of successpi = pj = P with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Consumers whose willingness to pay for the basic service v is no lower than the quality-
adjusted price P enter the market, so there are a−P active consumers. The total quantity
provided by firms is Q = q1+q2, so we have Q = a−P . Thus the inverse demand functions
faced by the firms are:
• case of success 
p
s
1 = a+ β1 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
ps2 = a+ β2 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
• case of failure 
p
f
1 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
pf2 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
With the superscripts s and f we denote the case of investment’s success and failure,
respectively. Note that psi here is a quality-adjusted Cournot price, which captures firm
i’s ability to provide value-added services. Since such abilities are differentiated between
the two firms, the quality-adjusted prices differ between the incumbent and the OLO, in
8Brito et al. (2012) use the Hotelling framework for the demand, which implies the possibility
of all consumers preferring one firm to the other.
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case of success. The demand for basic services running on the copper network, pCi is the
same as the demand in case of failure, so we have that
p
C
1 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
pC2 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
Supply side
A local connection to an end user is composed of two main elements, namely, a local
line and a line card. The first cost is borne by the network owner for maintaining the
daily operation of the essential input and is normalised to 0 in our model without loss of
generality. The second cost, incurred to provide services to end users at retail level, is
assumed to be constant and equal to c > 0. We assume that a market for the broadband
access service exists, i.e. a > c. The access charge to the copper network and to the NGN
are denoted with rC and rl, respectively, where the superscript l = P,F corresponds to
the cases of partial regulation and full regulation, respectively. The level of access charge
is decided by the incumbent, in case of partial regulation, or by the regulator, in case of
full regulation.
We assume that the regulator sets the access charge after the investment is deployed,
being aware of the presence of demand uncertainty. Hence, the access charge to the NGN
becomes rl,f in case of failure and rls in case of success.9
The investment in NGN entails a quadratic adoption cost given by Ci(m,∆) = m
2∆2φ/2.
∆ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor determined by the new-technology adoption date. Here
we use the same notation and interpretation as in Bourreau and Dogan (2005) that
∆ = exp(−δt) where δ is the discount rate normalised to 1 and t denotes time. ∆ reflects
the investment timing: a higher ∆ corresponds to an earlier investment. The extent of
network updating is represented by m ∈ [0, 1]. In our setting, the incumbent chooses ∆
optimally and invests in the whole network, i.e. m = 1, so Ci(∆) = ∆
2φ/2. φ is a positive
cost parameter. We assume the following: d
d∆C ≥ 0 and
d2
d∆2
C > 0. Notice that since the
investment cost decreases with time, there is no case in which there is no investment in
this setting, unlike in Brito et al. (2012).
9We have also solved the case where the regulator sets a single access charge for the NGN,
independent of demand. We discuss the solution of this case in footnote 11.
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The ex ante profits of the two firms are the following:
pi
l
1 = (1−∆)pi
C
1 +∆(γpi
l,s
1 + (1− γ)pi
l,f
1 )
pil2 = (1−∆)pi
C
2 +∆(γpi
l,s
2 + (1− γ)pi
l,f
2 )
Here, firms’ profits before the investment, denoted by the superscript C in the equa-
tions above to represent the use of the copper network, are equal to:
pi
C
1 = (p
C
1 − c)q
C
1 + r
CqC2
piC2 = (p
C
2 − c)q
C
2 − r
CqC2
Firms’ profits after investing in NGN, provided that the OLO also decides to use the
new infrastructure, are different depending on the true state of demand.
• case of success 
pi
l,s
1 = (p
l,s
1 − c)q
l,s
1 + r
l,sql,s2 − α
l∆φ/2
pil,s2 = (p
l,s
2 − c)q
l,s
2 − r
l,sql,s2 − (1− α
l)∆φ/2
• case of failure: 
pi
l,f
1 = (p
l,f
1 − c)q
l,f
1 + r
l,fql,f2 − α
l∆φ/2
pil,f2 = (p
l,f
2 − c)q
l,f
2 − r
l,fql,f2 − (1− α
l)∆φ/2
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the way in which the investment cost is shared
between the two firms. So we have that αP = αF = 1 and αRS ∈ (0, 1), because in case of
partial regulation or full regulation the investment is undertaken by the incumbent alone,
while in case of risk sharing the investment cost is somehow split among the two firms.
The following assumption is made for the model.
Assumption 1. rF ≥ 0 and rC = 0
This constraint imposes a lower bound limit to the NGN access price set by the reg-
ulator, rF , which cannot be lower than the network operation marginal cost, as in Foros
(2004). In other words, the incumbent must have a non-negative price cost margin on its
sale to the OLO if the NGN access market is regulated. In the second part of Assumption
1, we assume that the access fee to the copper network, rC , is regulated at marginal cost
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level. This second assumption restricts our attention to the problem of access price set-
ting in the NGN market and reflects the current situation in many countries, where the
regulation of the legacy network access charge is strictly cost-based.
Social Welfare
The social welfare function faced by the regulator at the moment of the access fee
setting is composed of a pre-investment part and a post-investment part, with l = P,F,RS,
C for copper and N for NGN, in the following way:
E(W l) = (1−∆)WC +∆E(WN,l)
with
WC =
(
a− pC1
2
qC1 +
a− pC2
2
qC2 + pi
C
1 + pi
C
2
)
E(WN,l) = γ
(
a+ β1 − p
l,s
1
2
ql,s1 +
a+ β2 − p
l,s
2
2
ql,s2 + pi
l,s
1 + pi
l,s
2 −∆φ/2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a− pl,f1
2
ql,f1 +
a− pl,f2
2
ql,f2 + pi
l,f
1 + pi
l,f
2 −∆φ/2
)
Stage 2: retail market competition
Firms compete under Cournot competition in the retail market. The resulting equi-
librium quantities in this segment are:
• Before investment
qC∗1 =
a− c
3
, qC∗2 =
a− c
3
• After successful investment
ql,s∗1 =
a− c+ rl,s + 2β1 − β2
3
, ql,s∗2 =
a− c− 2rl,s + 2β2 − β1
3
• After unsuccessful investment
ql,f∗1 =
a− c+ rl,f
3
, ql,f∗2 =
a− c− 2rl,f
3
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with l = P,F,RS denoting the different regulatory regimes.
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. 2βi ≥ βj , ∀i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j
The above inequality implies that the difference in ability to provide value-added ser-
vices between firms is not too large. Therefore with any given access price rl, each firm’s
quantity is a non decreasing function with respect to the investment. Under this assump-
tion, the incumbent cannot use the investment in NGN as a foreclosure tool (Foros (2004)).
Stage 2: the OLO chooses whether to use the NGN
Ex ante, the OLO decides to ask access to the NGN only if the expected profits from
doing so are not lower than the profits obtainable by providing services through the copper
network, whose access price is regulated at marginal cost level:
E(pil2) = γpi
l,s
2 + (1− γ)pi
l,f
2 ≥ pi
C
2
with l = P,F,RS.
Once we insert the equilibrium quantities, this inequality implies that:
γ
(
a− c− 2rl,s + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c− 2rl,f
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.1)
If the above condition is satisfied, the OLO will switch to the NGN once the investment
is deployed, but its success is still uncertain. In this case, the OLO does not behave
opportunistically and use the NGN even in case of failure.
Notice that the OLO would be indifferent to the relative balancing of the access charges
in case of failure and success, as long as the expected value of profits respects condition
(2.1), but we restrict our analysis to the case where using the NGN gives at least as much
profit as the copper network to the OLO. We impose this restriction to focus on the most
plausible equilibrium and to make the case of partial regulation readily comparable to the
case of full regulation. Following this restriction, in case of failure it must be true that:
(
a− c− 2rl,f
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.2)
where the left hand side of the equation is the profit with the NGN and the right hand
side is the profit with copper network.
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Following from the assumption that the copper network access price is regulated at
marginal cost level, condition (2.2) requires that:
rl,f = rC = 0 with l = P,F,RS (2.3)
Therefore, the access fee in case of failure will respect condition (2.3) and profits will
be the same as with the copper network under all regulatory regimes:
pil,f∗1 =
(
a− c
3
)2
, pil,f∗2 =
(
a− c
3
)2
After substituting the expression for pil,f∗2 , we can simplify the OLO’s ex ante constraint
2.1 in the following way:
(
a− c− 2rl,s + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.4)
2.2 Full Regulation
We consider this case as a benchmark for cost-based regulation, where the regulator chooses
the access charge by maximising a standard welfare function. In our case, cost-based
regulation translates in marginal cost pricing, so the regulator only ensures to cover the
incumbent’s operating costs.
Stage 1: the regulator sets the access price to the NGN
In this case, the regulator sets the access rule to the NGN in order to maximise social
welfare. Its objective function after investment is the following:
E(WN,F ) =γ
(
(qFs∗1 + q
Fs∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFs∗1 )
2 + rFsqFs∗2 −∆φ/2 + (q
Fs∗
2 )
2
)
(1− γ)
(
(qFf∗1 + q
Ff∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFf∗1 )
2 −∆φ/2 + (qFf∗2 )
2
)
We remind that rFf = 0 by condition (2.3).10 The first-order condition with respect
10In case of failure, the regulated access charge is set at the marginal cost level. From a policy
point of view, it would be more suitable and less distorsive to use other instruments rather than
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to rFs gives the access price as:
rFs∗ = c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2
c−a < 0 is a necessary condition for a broadband market to exist. If β1 > β2 so much
that 4β1−5β2 > a−c, then the solution to the first-order condition given by the expression
above is positive, rFs∗ > 0, implying that the regulator sets an above cost access charge.11
If, otherwise, the incumbent is worse than the OLO in offering value-added services,
β1 ≤ β2, or if it is better in offering value-added services but not by a great extent, β1 > β2
but 4β1−5β2 < a−c, the solution to the first-order condition is lower than the incumbent’s
marginal cost of network operations, i.e. rFs∗ < 0. The regulator, indeed, not only values
the fact that the OLO is able to increase demand through β2, as also the incumbent does
through β1, but it also values that the OLO’s presence increases competition downstream.
This is the reason why, in order to encourage the OLO’s participation into the NGN
market, the regulator may set a below-cost access charge. However, rFs∗ < 0 contradicts
Assumption 1, according to which rFs∗ ≥ 0, so in this case we will impose rFs∗ = 0, such
that optimal regulated access price will be set equal to the marginal cost.
The access price in case of full regulation is as following:
rF∗ =

0 if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− cc− a+ 4β1 − 5β2 otherwise
By substituting the values for rF∗ into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities,
we obtain the following expected quantities:
E(qF∗1 ) =

γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ2(β1 − β2) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
the access charge to help covering investment costs, i.e. public subsidies, in case of lack of demand
for value-added services.
11In an unreported document, available from the authors upon request, we analyse the case
where the regulator chooses a single access charge independent of demand, rˆ. The socially optimal
access charge becomes equal to c− a+ γ(4β1− 5β2), where γ is the probability of success. We can
observe that the solution remains exactly the same as in the basic model, unless β1 is so high that rˆ
becomes positive. In those cases, we observe that the range of parameters for which the regulated
access price is positive shrinks, meaning that the chance for the incumbent to be awarded of its
higher ability in offering services is lower. Moreover, the main difference to our basic model is that,
in case of failure, the OLO would be forced out of the NGN market, due to an above-cost access
price, making it switch back to the legacy network. Finally, in case of success, the access charge rˆ
would be lower than in our basic model, lowering the incumbent’s incentives to invest in the NGN.
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E(qF∗2 ) =

γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
OLO’s ability β2
0 g
4β1
5
− a−c
5
3β1
4
− a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
Exclusion operated
by the regulator
rF∗ = 4β1 − 5β2 − a+ c
rF∗ = 0
Figure 2: Full Regulation
From the above equations we can see that: when 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a − c, the expected
equilibrium quantities are positive, given a− c > 0 and Assumption 2; when 4β1 − 5β2 >
a− c, on one side, the incumbent’s expected quantity is unambiguously positive - because
a− c > 0 and β1 > β2 in this case -, and on the other side, the positive sign for the OLO’s
quantity is guaranteed by condition (2.4).12
Notice that condition (2.4) here implies that the regulator sets access conditions in
such a way not to exclude the OLO from the market, when the OLO has a lower ability in
offering value-added services with respect to the incumbent, although it is equally efficient
on the cost side. This case appears to be more realistic and in line with the institutional
framework in Europe.13
Simple algebra identifies the range for β2 for which it is possible to have a positive
regulated access price and the OLO active in the NGN market altogether. Such range of
parameters is:
3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2 < 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
where the right hand side corresponds to the condition for an above cost access price,
and the left hand side corresponds to the condition for non-exclusion of the OLO. This
range of parameters exists only if β1 > 2(a − c)/3. For all β1 ≤ 2(a− c)/3, the threshold
12Recall that condition (2.4) ensures the ex post convenience for the OLO to use the NGN in
any state of demand.
13The European Commission (2002, page 117−119), indeed, has adopted the standard of Equally
Efficient Operator (EEO) in the context of access regulation and price test. Besides that, demand
factors are less observable and much more volatile, so we would not expect the regulator to base
its decisions on access price on demand factors so heavily as to exclude an EEO from the market,
most of all in a situation where uncertainty plays a central role.
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value for β2 to have non-exclusion and positive access price is higher than the threshold
necessary to have a positive regulated access price in the first place, as shown in Figure 2.
Intuitively, as long as the OLO’s ability is higher than the incumbent’s one, the regula-
tor favours the OLO’s participation into the market through a low access price, i.e. setting
the access charge equal to the marginal cost. The regulator starts setting an above cost
access charge when the incumbent’s ability in boosting the demand becomes considerably
higher than the OLO’s one.14 In this case the OLO remains active in the market as long
as its ability is above some minimum threshold, 3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing
The incumbent will have different objective functions depending on the parameters.
When 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c, we have that r
F∗ = 0. Therefore the incumbent makes no profit
in the upstream market and its objective function is:
max
∆F
E(piF1 ) = (1−∆
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
∆F
(
γ
(
a− c+ 2β1 − β2
3
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (∆F )2φ/2
When 4β1−5β2 > a−c, we have that r
F∗ > 0, then the incumbent’s objective function
is:
max
∆F
E(piF1 ) =(1−∆
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
∆F
(
γ(2(β1 − β2)
2 + (c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2)(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1))+
(1− γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (∆F )2φ/2
The two first-order conditions with respect to investment timing ∆F give the following
14This result is in line with Mizuno and Yoshino (2012), who also find that, when the degree of
spillover is small, i.e. when the OLO has a lower ability to offer value-added services, the incumbent
has the incentive to overinvest in order to obtain an above cost access charge from the regulator.
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solution:15
∆F∗ =


(2(a−c)(2β1−β2)+(2β1−β2)2)γ
9φ if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
(−72(β1−β2)2+9(7β1−9β2)(a−c)+9β2(7β1−8β2)−10(a−c)2)γ
9φ otherwise
In line with Foros (2004), here we find that the optimal investment timing chosen
by the incumbent is negatively correlated with the OLO’s ability to provide value-added
services, i.e. d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0. When the regulated access price is set equal to the marginal
cost, the incumbent has no profit by leasing lines to the OLO in the upstream market.
Therefore the incumbent’s investment is a pure spillover, increasing with the OLO’s ability
to exploit the new technology. When the regulated access price is positive, the investment
decreases with the OLO’s ability. So in both cases, the better is the OLO, the later the
incumbent tends to invest.
When the probability of success increases, the incumbent’s incentive to invest in the
NGN decreases less rapidly with the OLO’s ability, d
2
dβ2dγ
∆F∗ < 0, but also the investment
is made earlier d
dγ
∆F∗ > 0. This happens because, other things being equal, a higher prob-
ability of success gives the incumbent overall higher incentives to invest. Therefore, the
effect for which an increase in the OLO’s ability determines a decrease in the incumbent’s
investment incentive becomes less strong if the probability of success is higher.
The socially optimal investment timing
If we substitute all equilibrium solutions into the welfare function, the first-order con-
dition with respect to ∆F,W gives the following result:16
∆F,W =


(8(a−c)(β1+β2)+11(β2−β1)2+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 4β1 − 5β2 < a− c
((a−c)2+9(2β2−β1)2+18β1(β1−β2)+18β2(a−c))γ
18φ otherwise
15This is the incumbent optimal investment timing as long as the conditions ((2(a − c)(2β1 −
β2)+ (2β1−β2)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 and ((−72(β1−β2)
2+9(7β1− 9β2)(a− c)+ 9β2(7β1− 8β2)− 10(a−
c)2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied. This is true for example if a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the
value of β’s changes according to the thresholds.
16This is the socially optimal investment timing as long as the conditions ((8(a− c)(β1 + β2) +
11(β2 − β1)
2 + 8β1β2)γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 and (((a − c)
2 + 9(2β2 − β1)
2 + 18β1(β1 − β2) + 18β2(a −
c))γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied. This is true for example if a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the
value of β’s changes according to the thresholds.
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2.3 Partial Regulation
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s profit function after investment is:
E(piP1 ) = γ((q
Ps∗
1 )
2 + rPsqPs∗2 ) + (1− γ)(q
Pf∗
1 )
2 −∆φ/2
Remind that rPf∗ = 0, by condition (2.3). We analyse the situation in which the
incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the OLO, differently from Nitsche and Wi-
ethaus (2011) who model the partial regulation case as a Nash bargaining. Considering
condition (2.4), the incumbent’s profit maximisation gives three parameters range that
determine different values for the access price chosen by the firm, as shown in Figure 3:
rPs∗ =


a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3 and 6β2 < 5β1
2β2−β1
2 if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
OLO’s ability β2
0 g5β1
6
β1 +
5(a−c)
6
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2
+ β1+4β2
10
)
(Exclusion occurs)
rPs∗ = 2β2−β1
2
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2
+ β1+4β2
10
)
Figure 3: Partial Regulation
When β2 is higher than β1 by a considerable extent, i.e. 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a − c)/3,
the OLO earns higher profits in the NGN market, though paying the unregulated access
charge, than in the outside option. Therefore, the incumbent charges the access price
that maximises its profits and allows the greatest rent extraction from the OLO in the
upstream market. The parameter threshold 2(β2−β1)/5 ≥ (a−c)/3 derives from condition
(2.4), once inserted the expression for the unregulated access price into the equilibrium
quantities.
If 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3, the corresponding expected equilibrium quantities are the
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following: 

E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
For intermediate values of the quality parameters, the incumbent will lower the access
price down to the point where condition (2.4) is verified with equality, once considered
the equilibrium quantities. When β1 is not considerably higher than β2 - as defined by
the second parameter threshold 6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the
parameters threshold) - the incumbent’s profit from charging the constrained access price
to the NGN is higher than the profit from exclusion.
In this case, we have an intermediate parameters range such that 2(β2 − β1)/5 <
(a − c)/3 and 6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see Figure 3), that yields the following expected equilibrium
quantities: 
E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Finally, when the incumbent is considerably better in offering value-added services, it
prefers to exclude the OLO from the NGN market.
Hence, for 6β2 < 5β1, we obtain:
E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
2β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Notice that since the OLO’s outside option is using the copper network rather than
leaving the market entirely, unlike in Foros (2004), the OLO gets better wholesale access
conditions. In Foros (2004), the incumbent always charges the unconstrained access price,
which excludes the entrant whenever the entrant’s ability to exploit the new network
is not higher than the incumbent’s ability. In this setting, for the parameters range
β1 + 5(a− c)/6 > β2 > β1, the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added
services, and the incumbent charges an access price which is lower than the unconstrained
access price. Furthermore, for the parameters range β1 > β2 ≥ 5β1/6, the incumbent is
better than the OLO in offering value-added services, but it charges an access price that
keeps the OLO active in the NGN market. The incumbent finds it convenient to do so
because exclusion would imply facing the OLO’s competition in the basic services market,
while being the only provider of the value-added services. As long as the OLO is not much
worse than the incumbent in offering value-added services, it is better for the incumbent
to keep this latter active in the NGN market and earn some rents from the upstream
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market, which the incumbent would not otherwise earn if the OLO used the regulated
copper network. Only for values of the parameters such that 5β1/6 > β2 there is exclusion
of the OLO.
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions rC = 0 and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j),
when the OLO has the outside option to use the regulated copper network rather than
leaving the market entirely, there is a range of parameters for which, absent regulatory
intervention, there is no exclusion in the provision of value-added services, even if the
incumbent’s ability is higher than the OLO’s ability in offering such services.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing ∆
After inserting rPs∗, qP∗1 and q
P∗
2 into the incumbent’s profit function, the first-order
condition of the profit maximisation with respect to ∆ returns the following investment
timings:17
∆P∗ =


(25(a−c)2+9(10β1(a−c)+(3β1−2β2)2+4β1β2))γ
180φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(3β21+2(a−c)(β1+2β2))γ
12φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(4β1(a−c+β1))γ
9φ if 6β2 < 5β1
We find that, when the OLO participates in the NGN market, the investment timing
is positively correlated with its ability to provide value-added services, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0. Since
the incumbent seeks to capture some rent from the OLO, the higher the OLO’s ability
is, the earlier the incumbent invests, hoping to earn from access rents in the upstream
market, in case of successful investment. This effect is stronger, the higher the probability
of success, d
2
dβ2dγ
∆P∗ > 0. Also, unsurprisingly, the investment is made earlier in time, the
higher the probability of success, d
dγ
∆P∗ > 0.
17This is the optimal investment timing chosen by the incumbent as long as the conditions
((25(a − c)2 + 9(10β1(a − c) + (3β1 − 2β2)
2 + 4β1β2))γ)/(180φ) ≤ 1, ((3β
2
1 + 2(a − c)(β1 +
2β2))γ)/(12φ) ≤ 1 and ((4β1(a − c + β1))γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied. This is true for example
if a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the value of β’s changes according to the thresholds.
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The socially optimal investment timing
As a benchmark for comparison, we now evaluate the socially optimal investment
timing. The social welfare function can be written as:
E(WP ) = (1−∆)WC +∆E(WN,P )
where E(WNP ) is the after-investment expected welfare with partial regulation P on the
NGN N and it is given by:
E(WN,P ) =γ
(
(qPs∗1 + q
Ps∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPs∗1 )
2 + rPs∗qPs∗2 − (∆)φ/2 + (q
Ps∗
2 )
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(qPf∗1 + q
Pf∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPf∗1 )
2 − (∆)φ/2 + (qPf∗2 )
2
)
The first term inside the brackets represents the consumer surplus, the last term is
the OLO’s profit and the remaining ones are the profit earned by the incumbent. After
inserting all equilibrium solutions into E(WP ), the first-order conditions with respect to
∆P yield the following results in the different cases:18
∆P,W =


(−5(a−c)2)γ
72φ +
(76(β2−β1)2+β1(55β1+20β2)+(130β1+20β2)(a−c))γ
200φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(9β21+4(a−c)(3β1+2β2))γ
24φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(11(β1−β2)2+8(a−c)(β1+β2)+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 6β2 < 5β1
The superscript W stands for the welfare maximising result.
2.4 Extension: Compulsory switch to NGN
In this extension we show what happens to the incumbent’s access price decisions when
there is compulsory switch to the NGN.19 In this case, the OLO’s outside option would
be exiting the market, as in Foros (2004). When the OLO’s alternative is leaving the
18This is the socially optimal investment timings as long as the conditions ((−5(a− c)2/(72φ))+
(76(β2 − β1)
2 + β1(55β1 + 20β2) + (130β1 + 20β2)(a − c))γ)/(200φ) ≤ 1, ((9β
2
1 + 4(a − c)(3β1 +
2β2))γ)/(48φ) ≤ 1 and ((11(β1− β2)
2 +8(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 8β1β2)γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied. This
is true for example if a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the value of β’s changes according to
the thresholds.
19At present, mandatory switch of the legacy network is not included in the EU regulatory
framework.
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market entirely, the only circumstance under which the OLO makes positive profits in the
NGN is when it has more ability to exploit the new network than the incumbent. When
β2 < β1, indeed, the incumbent is indifferent between charging an access price that ex-
tracts the OLO’s profits entirely, or one that fully excludes the OLO from the NGN market.
Stage 2: retail market competition
Equilibrium quantities in stage 2 are unchanged compared to our basic model.
The ex post participation conditions are different, since the copper network option is
not available anymore once the NGN investment is deployed. The outside option scenario
consists in the OLO exiting the market and the incumbent being monopolist:
pio,s1 =
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
, pio,s2 = 0
pio,f1 =
(
a− c
2
)2
, pio,f2 = 0
The ex post OLO’s participation conditions are the following:
• in case of success (
a− c− 2rl,s + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥ 0
• in case of failure (
a− c− 2rl,f
3
)2
≥ 0
The above conditions require that:
rl,s ≤
a− c+ 2β2 − β1
2
rl,f ≤
a− c
2
with l = P,F,RS.
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s profit function after investment is unchanged:
E(piP1 ) = γ((q
P,s∗
1 )
2 + rP,sqP,s∗2 ) + (1− γ)(q
P,f∗
1 )
2 −∆φ/2
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The expected access price chosen by the firm is the following:
rP∗ =


a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The corresponding expected equilibrium quantities are the following:


E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
As we can see, the incumbent always sells positive quantities, but the OLO has non-
negative quantities only if β2 > β1, i.e. with this access price level, whenever the OLO is
not at least as good as the incumbent in offering value-added services, it will be excluded
from the market. Alternatively, the incumbent can charge the constrained access price
that verifies the OLO’s ex post access condition with equality.
In the following we prove that, when β2 ≤ β1, the incumbent is indifferent between
charging the unconstrained access price that excludes the OLO and charging the con-
strained access price that verifies the OLO’s ex post participation constraints with equality,
rPconst∗, which is:
rP,const∗ =


a−c+2β2−β1
2 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The constrained access price in the equation above yields the following expected equi-
librium quantities: 
E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c+β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = 0
Therefore, the incumbent’s profits from exclusion, pio1 = γpi
o,s
1 + (1 − γ)pi
o,f
1 , or from
market sharing with the constrained access price, piP,s1 [rP=rP,const∗], are the same:
pio1 =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
piP,s1 [rP=rP,const∗] =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
When the OLO’s outside option is exiting the market entirely, if we assume that when
indifferent the incumbent favors market sharing, there is no case for exclusion with partial
regulation.
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The access conditions though are less favorable to the OLO. Whenever the OLO is not
at least as good as the incumbent in offering value-added services, its profits are driven
down to zero. In our basic model instead, we find that there is a case in which the OLO
is worse than the incumbent in offering value-added services but it earns positive profits
and remains active in the NGN market.
Proposition 2. When 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), if the regulator imposes a
compulsory switch to the NGN, the OLO remains active in the market if and only if its
ability to provide value-added services is higher than the incumbent’s one. Otherwise,
access conditions are such that the OLO’s profit are always driven to zero
2.5 Risk Sharing
We model the risk sharing agreement as an exogenous alternative, to highlight its potential
improvements over social welfare outcomes. More specifically, following Nitsche and Wi-
ethaus (2011), the risk sharing option is treated in a reduced form in which parties share
the fixed cost of investment through some agreement and then they can use the NGN
network without further side payments. In this respect, risk sharing may be thought as a
compulsory regime imposed on firms by the regulator.20
In this setting we do not have the choice of access price, because firms first compete
on services using the copper network and then use the commonly built NGN, without
further side payments for the network usage. Therefore we can directly analyse the choice
of investment timing.
Stage 0: Joint choice of investment timing
The expected equilibrium quantities in the last stage of the risk sharing game write as
below: 

E(qRS∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qRS∗2 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
20We do not address the specific nature of the risk sharing contracts in this paper. On this
point, Inderst and Peitz (2012b) analyse cost-sharing agreements between an incumbent firm and
an entrant, in the form of long term contracts concluded before the investment is made, as opposed
to contracting taking place after the network has been constructed. The authors show that the
former type of agreement reduces the duplication of investment and may lead to more areas being
covered. Coordination at the investment level may come at a price, though, which is reduced
competition in the areas thus covered.
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Assumption 2 ensures that both firms are active in the market, in every state of
demand.
The two firms choose the investment timing by maximising the sum of their expected
profits, E(piRS12 ), considering the equilibrium quantities in the retail market:
max
∆RS
E(piRS12 ) =(1−∆
RS)
2(a − c)2
9
+
∆RS
(
γ
(
(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)
2
9
+
(a− c+ 2β2 − β1)
2
9
)
+
(1− γ)
2(a − c)2
9
)
− (∆RS)2φ/2
Their choice yields the following timing for the investment in the NGN:21
∆RS∗ =
(2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2β1β2)γ
9φ
It is interesting to analyse how the choice of investment timing changes with the dif-
ference in the ability to offer value-added services and therefore with the returns from
the investment. Comparative statics shows that the sign of d
dβi
∆RS∗ depends on the
term 5βi − 4βj + a − c, with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Keeping β1 fixed, an increase in the
value of β2 unambiguously yields to anticipating the joint construction of the NGN, i.e.
d
dβ2
∆RS∗ > 0, when 5β2 − 4β1 + a − c ≥ 0, therefore, only when the OLO is better than
the incumbent, or when the incumbent is better than the OLO but not too much. When
5β2 − 4β1 + a − c < 0, the incumbent is considerably better than the OLO in offering
value-added services and an increase in the ability of the OLO delays the construction of
the NGN, i.e. d
dβ2
∆RS∗ < 0. This effect reflects the fact that, with risk sharing, the two
firms internalise the profit externalities generated by Cournot competition. Notice, in-
deed, that we encountered the same conditions for the solution to the first-order condition
in case of full regulation: rF∗ = 0 if 5β2−4β1+a−c ≥ 0 and r
F∗ > 0 if 5β2−4β1+a−c < 0.
The socially optimal investment timing
As a benchmark for comparison, we compute the socially optimal investment timing
21∆RS∗ is the optimal timing of investment when incumbent and OLO enter in a cooperation
agreement for the construction of the NGN infrastructure only if ((2(a−c)(β1+β2)+5(β1−β2)
2+
2β1β2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1. The second-order condition is always satisfied. This is true for example if
a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the value of β’s changes according to the thresholds.
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in case of risk sharing, which is:22
∆RS,W =
(8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1β2)γ
18φ
2.6 Comparison of results under partial regulation,
full regulation and risk sharing
We can derive new insights from this model by comparing the results obtained in case of
partial access regulation, full access regulation and risk sharing.
Proposition 3. For a given timing of investment ∆ and under the assumptions rF ≥ 0
and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), expected industry output E(Q
l(∆)) satisfies
E(QRS(∆)) >E(QP (∆))
E(QRS(∆)) ≥E(QF (∆))
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In line with Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), risk sharing is expected to induce more
competition than partial regulation and full regulation regimes. The first inequality
E(QRS(∆)) > E(QP (∆)) arises because risk sharing involves no wholesale transfers and
a more symmetric market structure, whereas partial regulation implies transfer from the
OLO to the incumbent and an asymmetric market structure, which reflects the lower
level of competition.23 The second inequality E(QRS(∆)) ≥ E(QF (∆)) arises because,
when the regulated access price is constrained to zero by Assumption 1, risk sharing and
full regulation yield the same outcome in terms of expected total quantities, but when
the regulated access price is positive, full regulation involves a positive transfer which is
higher than marginal cost of production, so the overall market efficiency is higher under
risk sharing.
The equilibrium results in terms of NGN access conditions and, consequentially, in-
vestment incentives, change depending on the relative and absolute value of firms’ abilities
in offering value-added services. In Table 1, we combine the various modes of regulation’s
22The equation above represents the socially optimal investment timing in case of risk sharing
as long as ((8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1β2)γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1. This is true for example if
a = 2, c = 1, γ = 0.87, φ = 2, while the value of β’s changes according to the thresholds.
23Notice that, with risk sharing, the possible difference in market shares reflects only quality
differences between firms, not differences in market power. If the two firms were equal in their
service quality, the resulting market structure would be symmetric under risk sharing.
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equilibrium outcomes, identifying five different relevant parameters ranges. For ease of ex-
position, we name them as following: P1F1RS, P2F1RS, P3F1RS, P3F2RS, P3F3RS.
Case P1F1RS describes the situation in which the OLO has considerably more ability
than the incumbent in offering value-added services through the NGN. In this case, when
the access price is not regulated, the incumbent chooses the monopoly price, whereas the
regulator would choose a negative access price that we constrained to zero by Assumption
1. In the second case, P2F1RS, the values of the two firms’ quality parameters are close
to each other, either favoring the incumbent or the OLO. Here, with partial regulation,
the incumbent chooses to charge a constrained access price that makes it indifferent for
the OLO to use the NGN or switch back to the copper network, while the full regulation
outcome is unchanged compared to the previous situation. As the OLO’s ability decreases
with respect to the incumbent’s one, the incumbent finds it less convenient to share the
NGN market with the OLO, up to a point where it prefers to provide the value-added
services alone. Therefore in the range of values P3F1RS, we obtain exclusion with partial
regulation, while the access price is zero with full regulation. When the incumbent becomes
considerably better than the OLO in boosting the demand, the regulator favors its activity
by imposing a positive regulated access price, but only insofar as that does not exclude
the OLO from the market - case P3F2RS. A positive regulated access price together with
non-exclusion is not possible if the difference between the two firms’ abilities is important
but their absolute values are low. In that case, the OLO would prefer to use the regulated
copper network if asked to pay for the NGN, as in case P3F3RS where we have double
exclusion, with full regulation and with partial regulation. We do not look into this case,
as explained in section 2.2. The following results yield:
Parameters Range Partial Regulation Full Regulation Risk Sharing
g > β2 ≥ β1 +
5(a−c)
6
P1F1RS
P1: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO in the NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
β1 +
5(a−c)
6 > β2 ≥
5β1
6
P2F1RS
P2: E(rP∗) constrained, OLO
in the NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
5β1
6 > β2 ≥
4β1
5 −
a−c
5
P3F1RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 >
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5 −
a−c
5 > β2 ≥
3β1
4 −
a−c
6
P3F2RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F2: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO in the NGN market
RS: no upstream transfers
3β1
4 −
a−c
6 > β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 ≤
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5 −
a−c
5 > β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
Table 1: Relevant Parameters Thresholds
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OLO’s ability β2
0 gβ1 +
5(a−c)
6
β1 = β2
5β1
6
4β1
5
− a−c
5
3β1
4
− a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
P1F1RS
P2F1RS
P3F1RS
P3F2RS
P3F3RS
Figure 4: Relevant parameter thresholds
Proposition 4. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.2) and (2.4), the following results hold:
1. Both firms are active in the market no matter what is the regulatory regime, when
β2 ≥ 5β1/6;
2. The OLO is excluded from the NGN market with partial regulation, when β2 <
5β1/6;
3. The investment is undertaken later with full regulation and risk sharing with respect
to partial regulation: ∆F∗ < ∆P∗; ∆RS∗ < ∆P∗;
4. The investment is undertaken later with full regulation with respect to risk sharing
when the regulated access price is zero, while the relationship is ambiguous when the
regulated access price is positive: for β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3, ∆
F∗ < ∆RS∗; ∆F∗ Q ∆RS∗,
for β1 > 2(a− c)/3;
5. The OLO’s ability to provide value-added services through the NGN affects the in-
vestment timing. The effect is positive with partial regulation, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0; negative
with full regulation, d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0; ambiguous with risk sharing, where the impact of
a firm’s ability to offer value-added services on the investment timing changes from
positive to negative as β2’s absolute value decreases with respect to β1, or vice versa;
6. The investment is undertaken later than in the social optimum, under all regulatory
regimes: ∆P∗ < ∆P,W ; ∆F∗ < ∆F,W ; and ∆RS∗ < ∆RS,W .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The OLO always benefits from a spillover effect from the construction of the NGN
done by the incumbent. Nevertheless, the incumbent can potentially capture some rent by
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leasing its infrastructure to the rival. Under full regulation though, unless the incumbent
has considerably more ability to exploit the new network, the rent is set just equal to
the marginal cost by the regulator, so the incumbent earns nothing from the upstream
market. In this case, its investment incentive is dampened. Therefore, it chooses to invest
later with respect to the unregulated scenario. This confirms the finding in the literature
that access price regulation plays a disincentive role in the incumbent’s investment decision
(Kotakorpi (2006)). It is worth pointing out that, although in this model firms earn strictly
positive profits in the full regulation case thanks to the Cournot competition assumption,
a similar result is found in a setting with Hotelling competition by Kotakorpi (2006). Less
uncertainty mitigates such effect: when the investment success becomes more likely, the
speed at which the incumbent delays its investment plans when β2 is higher decreases,
d2
dβ2dγ
∆F∗ < 0.
When β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there is a range of parameters, 3β1/4 − (a − c)/6 ≤ β2 <
4β1/5− (a− c)/5, for which the regulated access price is positive, the OLO is active in the
NGN market with full regulation, but it is excluded with partial regulation. In this case,
partial regulation gives the highest investment incentive, but the relationship between full
regulation and risk sharing in terms of investment timing is ambiguous.
2.7 Welfare analysis
The previous analysis revealed that risk sharing induces the highest expected level of
competition downstream for a given investment timing, in line with Nitsche and Wiethaus
(2011), while partial regulation gives the strongest investment incentive. In this section,
we provide a comprehensive welfare ranking of the different modes of regulation, broken
down according to the range of parameter values shown in Figure 4. In the Appendix A.1.4
we report a detailed overview of the results. From these results, we derive the following
statement.
Proposition 5. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.2) and (2.4), the following results hold:
1. Expected consumer welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regula-
tion;
2. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added services, expected
total welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regulation;
3. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in offering value-added services or
when the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent, expected consumer
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welfare and expected total welfare are higher under partial regulation compared to full
regulation. Otherwise, the difference in total welfare and consumer welfare between
partial and full regulation remains ambiguous.
4. When the access price to the NGN is regulated at marginal cost level, expected con-
sumer welfare and expected total welfare are higher under risk sharing compared to
full regulation;
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Once taken into account the equilibrium choice of investment timing, we find that risk
sharing yields a higher expected consumer surplus than full regulation. When the regulated
access price is zero, risk sharing also unambiguously yields a higher overall welfare than
full regulation. However, when comparing partial regulation and risk sharing, investment
incentives and intensity of competition move in opposite directions, therefore the results
in terms of expected consumer welfare and expected total welfare change depending on
the parameter values.
In particular, when the OLO is better in offering value-added services, the incumbent
charges an access price that ensures the OLO‘s participation to the NGN with partial
regulation, while the access price is set to marginal cost with full regulation, i.e. cases
P1F1RS and P2F1RS with β2 ≥ β1. Under these circumstances, risk sharing is unam-
biguously dominant, both from a total welfare and a consumer welfare viewpoint. Even
though risk sharing investment incentives are lower compared to partial regulation, the
higher competitive intensity more than compensates for the delay in building the NGN.
When the incumbent is better in offering value-added services, the welfare analysis be-
comes less clear. In the range of parameters for which the incumbent charges a constrained
access fee and both firms are active in the NGN market, i.e. P2F2RS with β2 < β1, we
find that full regulation still yields the least desirable outcome, but the relationship be-
tween partial regulation and risk sharing is ambiguous both from a consumer welfare and
a total welfare viewpoint. The trade-off between stronger investment incentives under
partial regulation and higher competitive intensity under risk sharing is less stark when
the incumbent charges the lower constrained access fee. Therefore, depending on the
parameters, total welfare can be higher or lower under risk sharing or partial regulation.
Finally, we analyse two cases in which the incumbent finds it more convenient to
exclude the OLO from the NGN market. In this case, the OLO offers broadband services
using the copper network, making positive profits thanks to the regulated access price.
Under this circumstance, when the incumbent’s ability in offering value-added services is
not too high, i.e. β1 ≤ 2(a−c)/3, there is exclusion with partial regulation and a marginal
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cost access pricing with full regulation, i.e. P3F1RS. Risk sharing is still unambiguously
better than full regulation, both from a total welfare and a consumer welfare perspective.
The relationship between partial regulation and risk sharing in terms of total welfare
outcome is ambiguous.
When the incumbent’s ability in offering value-added services is high enough, i.e.
β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there is exclusion with partial regulation, and, for a certain range of
parameters, the regulator sets an above cost access price to the NGN and the OLO remains
active in the NGN market, i.e. P3F2RS, with full regulation. In this case, investment
incentives under partial regulation are so high that total welfare turns out to be the highest
compared to risk sharing and full regulation. The relationship between risk sharing and
full regulation in terms of total welfare is ambiguous: investment incentives can be higher
or lower depending on the parameters, but consumer welfare is always higher with risk
sharing.
3 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we model the competition between a vertically-integrated incumbent firm
and a facilities-free OLO in the broadband market, where the former has the option to
invest in building a NGN that allows firms to drastically increase the quality and variety
of their services. Market success of the NGN in terms of demand increase is uncertain.
Differently from other studies that assume demand uncertainty, the investment choice is
analysed in a dynamic setting with differentiated products. The analysis is conducted
under three different possible modes of regulation: full regulation (the NGN is regulated),
partial regulation (the NGN is unregulated) and risk sharing (fixed investment costs are
shared but there are no side payments between firms for the use of the NGN).
Our analysis reveals that the investment is always undertaken later than in the social
optimum in all regulatory regimes. The investment choice is affected by the OLO’s ability
to offer value-added services. Such effect is positive with partial regulation and negative
with full regulation, while with risk sharing the effect changes from positive for high values
of the OLO’s ability, β2, to negative as the incumbent’s ability, β1, gets considerably bigger
than β2, and vice versa. Partial regulation always yields the earliest investment compared
to the other regulatory regimes, while risk sharing ensures the highest level of competitive
intensity.
Welfare outcomes reveal that risk sharing is the dominant regime in a consumer surplus
perspective. Expected consumer surplus is always higher under risk sharing than under
partial regulation, but also under full regulation for a large set of parameters. In partic-
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ular, when both firms are active, full regulation’s consumer surplus outcome is the least
preferable; only when the incumbent’s ability is so high that the regulated access price
to the NGN is above marginal cost, the comparison of outcomes in terms of consumer
surplus between full regulation and risk sharing becomes ambiguous.
Furthermore, when the OLO is better in offering value-added services, risk sharing is
the dominant regime also from a total welfare perspective. When the incumbent is better,
instead, welfare comparisons between the three regulatory regimes become less clear.
It is worth pointing out that these results are valid for the reduced form of risk sharing
that we have considered in this paper. Such form of risk sharing implies a long term
contract with no side payments for the use of the NGN, thereby excluding sources of
inefficiency from the market and increasing the level of competitiveness downstream. More
complicated contractual forms of risk sharing might arise in reality, which could well make
the welfare comparison with full regulation less favorable to risk sharing. In terms of policy
recommendations, we can state that, if risk sharing works smoothly, as in the model, then
it allows for welfare improvements compared to full regulation. While, indeed, looking
deeper into how risk sharing works is worth additional future research.
Our analysis sheds some conceptual light on the debate about what is the socially
preferable access regulation regime to prompt telecommunications network development.
The difference in firms’ ability to provide value-added services is important in the context.
It exerts influence on the investment choice and on the access pricing decisions, which
in turn affect market competition and social welfare. We find that demand uncertainty
requires a careful formulation of access regulation rules. A robust set of rules should
take into account the potential for an investment failure and provide reasonable access
conditions for the firms involved in all possible cases. Also, uncertainty plays the role of
delaying the investment decision in all regimes. According to our analysis, risk sharing
can be particularly beneficial for consumers and give fairly high investment incentives at
the same time. At this stage, it would also be interesting to go further in the research to
study how risk sharing agreement can be robust to the inclusion of late entrants, to avoid
that the construction of the NGN could possibly become a new source of market power
and thereof be unable to deploy all of its benefits. It would also be interesting to make
the choice to engage in a risk sharing agreement endogenous. We leave these questions for
future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When 2(β2−β1)/5 < (a−c)/3, partial regulation unconstrained access price gives the OLO
less profits than the outside option. The access price that verifies the OLO’s participation
constraint 2.4 with equality is:
a− c+ rPs + 2β2 − β1
3
=
a− c
3
rPs =
2β2 − β1
2
The incumbent will prefer to charge the access price corresponding to the equation
above, rather than charging the unconstrained access price and exclude the OLO, as long
as the outside option profits from being the only provider of the value-added services
through the NGN are not higher than the market sharing profits:
piPs
1[rPs∗=
(2β2−β1)
2
]
≥ pio1(
a− c
3
+
β1
2
)2
+
(2β2 − β1)
2
(a− c)
3
≥
(
a− c
3
+
2β1
3
)2
The above inequality is unambiguously satisfied only for values of β’s such that the
incumbent‘s advantage in ability to offer value-added services is not too large:
6β2 ≥ 5β1
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Total expected quantities for a given investment timing, under the different modes of
regulation are the following:
• Partial regulation


E(QP ) = (1−∆P )a−c3 +∆
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
(
3β1+2β2
10 −
a−c
6 )γ
))
if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
E(QP ) = (1−∆P )a−c3 +∆
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
β1γ
2
)
if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
E(QP ) = (1−∆P )a−c3 +∆
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
β1γ
3
)
if 6β2 < 5β1
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• Full regulation


E(QF ) = (1−∆F )a−c3 +∆
F
(
2(a−c)
3 +
(β1+β2)γ
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
E(QF ) = (1−∆F )a−c3 +∆
F
(
(2β2 − β1)γ +
(a−c)(2+γ)
3
)
otherwise
• Risk sharing
E(QRS) = (1−∆RS)
a− c
3
+ ∆RS
(
2(a− c)
3
+
(β1 + β2)γ
3
)
We now compare partial regulation and full regulation with risk sharing, considering
the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined in Table 1, and
Assumption 2:
• if P1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
10(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
20(a − c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ
10(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (20(a − c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ) = (β2 −
β1
2
)γ > 0
• if P2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
4(a − c) + 3β1γ
2(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (4(a − c) + 3β1γ) = (2β2 − β1)γ > 0
• if P3RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + β1γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + β1γ) = β2γ > 0
• if F1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
= 1
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• if F2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ) = (4β1 − 5β2 − (a− c))γ > 0
Therefore, E(QRS) > E(QP ) and E(QRS) ≥ E(QF ).
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(1) and (2) Proof of these statements derives directly from Proposition 1.
(3) Investment timing: partial regulation vs full regulation and risk sharing
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined in
Table 1, and Assumption 2:
• if P1F1
∆P
∆F
=
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))) =
(5(a− c) + β1 + 4β2)
2 > 0
• if P2F1
∆P
∆F
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)) =
4(2β2 − β1)(10(a − c) + 7β1 − 2β2) > 0
• if P3F1
∆P
∆F
=
4(a− c+ β21
(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)
4(a− c+ β21)− (2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2) = β2(a− c+ 4β1 − β2) > 0
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• if P3F2
∆P
∆F
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)
2) =
10(a − c)2 + 76(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(−55β1 + 68β2) + (a− c)(−59β1 + 81β2) > 0
• if P1RS
∆P
∆RS
=
25(a− c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
25(a − c)2 + 10(5β1 − 4β2)(a− c)− 4(5β1 − 4β2)
2 + 9β1(9β1 − 8β2) > 0
• if P2RS
∆P
∆RS
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
(2β2 − β1)(2(a − c) + 11β1 − 10β2) > 0
• if P3RS
∆P
∆RS
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2) =
− β21 + 2(a− c)(β1 − β2) + 8β1β2 − 5β
2
2 > 0
Therefore, ∆F∗ < ∆P∗; and ∆RS∗ < ∆P∗.
(4) Investment timing: risk sharing vs full regulation
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the specific conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as defined in
Table 1, and Assumption 2:
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• if F1RS
∆RS
∆F
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2 − ((2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))) =
2(2β2 − β1)(a− c) + (2β2 − β1)
2 > 0
• if F2RS
∆RS
∆F
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a − c)2
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2−
(−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)
2) =
10(a− c)2 + (83β2 − 61β1)(a− c) + 77(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(72β2 − 61β1) Q 0
Therefore, for β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3, ∆
F∗ < ∆RS∗; for β1 > 2(a − c)/3 (the only case in
which there is no exclusion with a positive regulated access price), ∆F∗ Q ∆RS∗ .
(5) Comparative statics
Our comparative statics results, considering the specific conditions under each relevant
parameter threshold, as defined in Table 1, and Assumption 2, are shown below:
• if P1
δ(∆P )
δ(β2)
=
2(β2 − β1)γ
5φ
> 0
• if P2
δ(∆P )
δ(β2)
=
(a− c)γ
3φ
> 0
• if P3, the OLO is not in the NGN market.
• if F1
δ(∆F )
δ(β2)
=
−(2(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)γ
9φ
< 0
• if F2
δ(∆F )
δ(β2)
=
(−9(a − c) + 23β1 − 32β2)γ
phi
< 0
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• RS
δ(∆RS)
δ(β2)
=
2(a− c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
2(a − c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
> 0 if β2 > 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
2(a − c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
≤ 0 if β2 ≤ 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
Therefore, d
dβ2
∆P∗ > 0; d
dβ2
∆F∗ < 0; and d
dβ2
∆RS∗ changing as shown above.
(6) Comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment tim-
ing
The comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment timing
in the different regulatory regimes give the following results, considering conditions for
each parameter range as defined in Table 1 and all other assumptions:
• if P1
∆P,W
∆P
= −3((125(a−c)2)−30(3β1+2β2)(a−c)−15β1(β1+4β2)−108(β1−β2)
2) > 0
• if P2
∆P,W
∆P
= −6β21 − 4(a− c)(β1 + 2β2) + (4(a− c)(3β1 + 2β2) + 9β
2
1) > 0
• if P3
∆P,W
∆P
= 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1(β2 − β1) + 8β2(a− c) > 0
• if F1
∆F,W
∆F
= 3(β21 + 4β2(a− c) + β2(3β2 − 2β1)) > 0
• if F2
∆F,W
∆F
= 21(a− c)2+(180β2−126β1)(a− c)+171(β1−β2)
2+β2(153β2−126β1) > 0
• RS
∆RS,W
∆RS
= (β1 + 2β2)(4(a − c) + β1 + 2β2) > 0
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Therefore, ∆P∗ < ∆P,W ; ∆F∗ < ∆F,W ; and ∆RS∗ < ∆RS,W .
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Expected consumer welfare is defined as:
E(CSl) =∆l∗(CSC) + (1−∆l∗)E(CSl)
=∆l∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
)
+ (1−∆l∗)
(
γ
(
(Ql,s∗)2
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(Ql,f∗)2
2
))
with Ql = ql1 + q
l
2.
Expected total welfare is defined as:
E(W l) = ∆l∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
+ (qC∗1 )
2 + (qC∗2 )
2
)
+
(1−∆l∗)
(
γ
(
(Ql,s∗)2
2
+ (ql,s∗1 )
2 + rl,sql,s∗2 −∆
l∗φ/2 + (ql,s∗2 )
2
)
+
(1− γ)
(
(Ql,f∗)2
2
+ (ql,f∗1 )
2 −∆l∗φ/2 + (ql,f∗2 )
2
))
Our analysis reveal the following ranking of expected total welfare and expected con-
sumer welfare, respectively. Notice that the results are broken down according to the
relevant parameter thresholds defined in Table 124.

E(WRS) > E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS, with β2 ≥ β1
E(WRS) Q E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P2F1RS, with β2 < β1
E(WRS) > E(WF ) ; E(WRS) Q E(WP ) ; E(WP ) Q E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(WP ) > E(WRS) Q E(WF )] if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS


E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) > E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) Q E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) Q E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS
We now proceed by analysing each single statement contained in Proposition 5.
(1) Consumer welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation
24Since expressions are cumbersome, detailed equations are available from the authors upon
request.
40
In order to compare consumer welfare outcomes it is sufficient to compare total quantities.
So we check under each of the specific parameter thresholds, defined in Table 1 and find:

QP
QRS
< 0 if P1RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P2RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P3RS
Therefore, E(CSRS) > E(CSP ).
(2) Total welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation and (3) Total welfare and consumer
welfare: partial regulation vs full regulation
From the results above, we derive that, in all cases in which β2 ≥ β1, namely P1F1RS
and P2F1RS (only for the part in which β2 ≥ β1): W
RS > WP > WF . Furthermore,
when the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent and the regulated access
price is positive, case P3F2, we have: WP > WF .
(4) Total welfare and consumer welfare: risk sharing vs full regulation
In order to compare consumer welfare outcomes, it is sufficient to compare total quantities.
So we check under each of the specific parameter thresholds, defined in Table 1 and find:

QF
QRS
< 0 if F1RS
QF
QRS
Q 0 if F2RS (happening without exclusion only if β1 > 2(a− c)/3)
Therefore, E(CSRS) > E(CSF ) when the access price is regulated at marginal cost level,
and the relationship is ambiguous when the access price is positive. Also, from the results
above, we obtain that only in case F1: WRS > WF .
(5) Total welfare and consumer welfare: full regulation ranking
From the results above, we can conclude that, in all cases in which there is no exclusion
of the OLO from the NGN market, namely P1F1RS and P2F1RS: WRS > WF and
WP > WF ; CSRS > CSF and CSP > CSF .
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